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THE LIABILITY OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS FOR TORTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
E. B. SCHULZ*
A question of major importance in a society marked by the steady growth of
governmental activities is the degree of legal responsibility for injuries to persons
and property resulting from the performance of public services. The limited
liability of governmental units in the United States has often been the subject
of unfavorable comment, especially in recent years, and there is a growing sentiment in favor of a change in policy.' This could readily be accomplished by action
of the legislatures and the courts. Since municipal corporations do not enjoy the
general immunity from suit accorded the national government and the states, a
survey of the law of municipal liability for torts, besides revealing the maximum
involuntary liability of any single unit of government, affords a means of ascertaining the trend of legislative and judicial opinion with regard to its extension.
The situation in Pennsylvania will be presented according to the following
plan: (1) a consideration of the basic principles adhered to by the courts and
the manner of their application in specific instances; (2) a discussion of excep*B. S., University of Michigan, 1920; M. A. in Municipal Administration, University ot Michigan, 1921; Ph. D., University of Michigan, 1927; member, Tau Beta Pi, American Political Science
Association, Governmental Research Association, National Municipal League, American Association
of University Professors; Secretary, Bureau of Government, University of Michigan; Staff member,
Detroit Bureau of Governmental Research; Instructor, University of Cincinnati, 1922-1923; Instructor,
University of Michigan, 1924-1927; Associate professor of Political Science, Lehigh University, 1927-.
1E. M. Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort", 34 Yale L. JI. 1, 129, 229 (19241925) ; "Governmental Responsibility in Tort", 36 Yale L. JI. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927); "Theories
of Governmental Responsibility in Tort", 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928) ; "Municipal Responsibility for the Torts of Policemen", 42 Yale L. JI. 241 (1932) ; L. W. Feezer, "Capacity, to Bear
Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of Tort Cases", 78 U. Pa. L. Rew. 805 (1930), 79
U. Pa. L. Rev. 742 (1931); C. W. Tooke, "Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort", 19 Va. J.
Rev. 97 (1932); Editorial Notes, "Inroads upon Immunity in Tort", 46 Harv. L. Rev. 305 (1932).
Attention is directed to the references in Borchard's "Municipal Responsibility for the Torts of Policemen", 42 Yale L. JI. 244, 245, note 17.
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tions to the general rules; (3) a summary of pertinent constitutional and statutory
provisions; and (4) an appraisal of the legislative and judicial attitudes toward
curtailment of the immunity which Pennsylvania municipalities now enjoy.
BASIC PRINCIPLES

Two basic principles are applied by the Pennsylvania courts in liability cases
involving municipal corporations. According to the Supreme Court, the controlling question in determining the common law liability'or non-liability of a
municipal corporation for torts is whether the nature of the service is corporate
and private or governmental and public. 2 If acting in a corporate or business
capacity, a municipality may be held liable, but if exercising powers of a public
or governmental character, immunity from liability is ordinarily the rule. A
second guiding principle relieves a municipality from liability for negligence when
its duties fall within the terms "legislative", "judicial", or "discretionary" as distinguished from "absolute", "imperative", or "ministerial". In spite of ambiguous
expressions of judicial opinion concerning its significance and proper application,
this rule, as ordinarily used in Pennsylvania, is clearly supplementary to the publicprivate criterion of liability.
THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE OR GOVERNMENTAL-CORPORATE

RULE

Since so much depends upon the capacity in Which a municipality acts, the
basis of distinction between public or governmental and private or corporate functions is obviously a matter of primary importance. In Pennsylvania, municipalitics
have been held to be acting in a governmental cairacity if exercising the police
power; if dealing with a matter of general concern or discharging duties for the
public or general benefit, such as protection of health and property; if performing
a service delegated to the municipality to be exercised on behalf of the sovereign
state; and if performing gratuitously a service of such a character as to come within the broad legal meaning of the term "charitable". Although these are by no
means mutually exclusive criteria, they are presented as such because of the language
used by the Supreme Court in various opinions.'
2Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 553, 124 At. 273, 274 (1924).

3"A charity in a legal sense may be more fully defined as a gift to be applied consistently with
existing laws for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or
hearts under the influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or
constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public
buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burdens of government." Fire Insurance Patrol v
Boyd, 120 Pa. 624 (1888), quoting Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen 556 (Mass.)
4
Devers v. Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 At. 540 (1932) ; Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 At.
567 (1929) ; Balashaitis et ux. v. Lackawanna County, 296 Pa. 83, 145 At. 691 (1929); American

Aniline Products, Inc. v. Lock'Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 135 AtI. 726 (1926) ; Scibilia v. Philadelphia,
279 Pa. 549, 124 At. 273 (1924); Moore v. Luzerne County, 262 Pa. 216, 105 Ad. 94 (1918);
Betham v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 302, 46 Ad. 448 (1900); Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 492, 31
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To determine whether or not a municipality is acting in its corporate or private capacity, the following tests have been applied: Is the activity carried on for
the peculiar benefit of the corporation in its local and special interests, i.e., for
the private advantage and benefit of its inhabitants?; Is the activity one of a business
nature such as is generally carried on by individuals or private corporations?; Is
a business or commercial revenue derived and intended to be derived from the
performance of the service causing injury?' An affirmative answer to all three
of these questions is not essential, nor is the fact that certain services give rise
to income sufficient in itself to place them in the "corporate" category.
The Supreme Court has stated that in distinguishing between the governmental and business powers of a public body regard should be had, not so much
to the nature and character of the various powers conferred, as to the object and purpose of the legislature in conferring them. "If granted for public purposes exclusively they belong to the corporate body in its public, political or municipal character.
But if the grant 'Was for purposes of private advantage or emolument, though the
public may derive a common benefit therefrom, the corporation, quod hoc, is to be
regarded as a private company.'5
As illustrated by the following cases, the derivation of income may prove to
be the determining force if an exercise of the police power is not involved. Bodge
v. Philadelphia6was a case in which a man was run over by a team driven by one
of the employees of the electrical bureau of the city. The court, holding that the
city was acting in its corporate capacity, stressed the fact that while the bureau
neither manufactured nor sold electricity, it derived an annual revenue of about
$150,000 from certain grants of privileges to private citizens and corporations. The
bureau was described as "a revenue producing department of the municipal government" which could in no proper sense be regarded as "a branch of the police
power of the municipality." It was also held that in the performance of municipal
duties for the benefit of the city the employees of the bureau were in fact the
servants of the city in like manner as the employees of its gas and water depart7
ments. In Scibilia v. Philadelphia
the plaintiff was injured by a city-owned
truck hauling ashes to a city dump and operated by an employee of the Bureau of
Street Cleaning of the Department of Public Works. The immunity of the city
from liability was recognized on the ground that even though some small incidental
revenue may be gained therefrom, the collection of ashes, being an exercise of the
police power for the promotion of public health, is a governmental function.
Commenting upon the weight to be attached to derivation of income from the
performance of a service, the Supreme Court said: "Where the authority exercised
At. 728 (1895); Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 141 (1872); Carr v. The Northern Liberties,
35 Pa. 324 (1860).
5
Moore v. Luzerne County, 262 Pa. 222, 105 At. 96 (1918).
6167 Pa. 492, 31 At. 728 (1895).
7279 Pa. 549, 124 Ad. 273 (1924).
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or thing done, is on the borderline between the private and the governmental
capacities in which municipalities may act, and has features suggestive of both,
charges made for and commercial income derived from the rendition of the services
involved have been given decisive influence as elements which determine the case
to be of a kind where damages for injuries may be recovered, and the absence
of these elements has been allowed force the other way."8 A situation existed
in Kappel v. Pittsburgh9 in which this rule would probably have been applied it
the Allegheny County Court had drawn different conclusions concerning the
authority of the city to perform the service involved. Suit for damages had been
brought because an automobile was stolen while parked in a place maintained by
the city on a public wharf and in charge of its employees. Although the plaintiff
had paid a parking fee, the court ruled that inasmuch as no act of the state legislature
authorized the operation of an automobile parking place, the city was exercising
its police power and consequently acting in a governmental capacity.
The recent case of Bell v. Pittsburgh ° affords an excellent illustration of the
perplexities arising from the practice of distinguishing between governmental
and corporate functions. It also demonstrates the legal consequences of a mixture
of these two types of activity. Helen Bell, who entered a public building jointly
owned and occupied by Pittsburgh and Allegheny County, was injured as a result
of the negligent operation of a county elevator by a county employee while on
her way to the public welfare department of the city. The building housed the
various county offices, the courts of common pleas, the bar association, the law
library, and such city offices as those of the mayor, treasurer, the police, public
safety, health and public welfare departments, the bureau of water, and all revenne
producing bureaus. Part of the building was rented to private enterprises, including a cigar stand, public telephones, and a tunnel under the building. Upholding
an award of damages to the plaintiff, the Supreme Court asserted that when
a county and city jointly own and occupy a building for governmental and business purposes, the fact that some of the activities centered in the building are
exclusively of a purely governmental nature will not affect liability for negligence
when they are joined with business activities. Where elevators are operated ii
such a jointly owned building, they must always be considered in the use in which
the joint arrangement places them, namely, joint business and government use.
A trip on such an elevator by one in regard to a governmental function, and a
trip by one in respect to business, in the same vehicle, cannot be separated when
viewing the duties and responsibilities of the carriers which transport the parties.
Where the acts in furtherance of the activities of the separate agencies are at
times mingled and at times alternated, there is no separation when, testing their
9279 Pa. 557, 124 At. 276 (1924).
977 Pitts. Leg. J1. 218 (1929).

10297 Pa. 185, 146 Ad. 567 (1929).
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legal effect as related to responsibility for the negligent acts of servants. Reason
and justice dictate that the rules governing business activities predominate. The
two bodies jointly engage in business enterprises in leasing part of the structure,
and it seems that the combination of their interests to effect a given purpose
through the- joint building was in itself a business enterprise, in that it lessened
the cost of government operation. Where a person goes into one of such elevators,
operated by a county employee, to go to a city department, and is injured by the
negligent operation of the elevator, both city and county are liable."
As evidenced by the foregoing and other cases, the criteria for determining
whether a city is acting in a public or private capacity are not so precise as to
prevent difficulties in application. The Supreme Court, discussing the problem
in the Scibilia case, pointed out that in these days of increasing governmental
activity, the demarcation between what are purely public functions within the
police power and what are not is becoming increasingly difficult to observe, and
remarked that the courts must classify each act as best they can in view of existing
legislation relevant to the situation, applicable general principles, and the nearest
pertinent authorities. "Attempts at the statement of general rules," said the Court,
"to control or guide the judiciary in determining these questions have in the past
12
proved rather futile."'
APPLICATION OF THE

GOVERNMENTAL-CORPORATE

RULE

By virtue of this governmental-corporate test of liability, it is well established
in Pennsylvania that no action to recover damages lies against a municipality for
the negligence of its police, fire, or health departments, unless such a right
is clearly given by act of the state legislature, because the service of these departments, being delegated to the municipality to be performed on behalf of the state,
is governmental in character.' 3 The most recent decisions are based directly
upon the public nature of these services, but in some of the earlier cases other
grounds for exemption from liability were also advanced. In Elliott v. Philadelphia,14 decided in 1874, policemen had arrested a servant for driving his master's
11297 Pa. 190, 191, 146 At. 568 (1929).
12279 Pa. 559, 124 At. 277 (1924).
13Police: Graff v. McKeesport, 316 Pa. 263, 175 Atl. 426 (1934); Steele v. McKeesport, 298
Pa. 116, 148 Atl. 53 (1929) ; Jameson v. Philadelphia, 282 Pa. 207, 127 Ail. 629 (1925) ; Norristown
v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121 (1880) ; Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) ; Miller v. Hastings
Borough, 25 Super. Ct. 569 (1904) ; Cover v. Johnston, 2 Blair Cty. L. R. 22 (1901); Fcol v. The
Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (1841). Fire Protection: Devers v. Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161 At!.
540 (1932); Kies v. Erie, 135 Pa. 144, 19 At. 942 (1890) ; Fire Insurance Patrol v. Boyd, 120 Pa.
624, 15 At!. 553 (1888); Knight v. Philadelphia, 15 W. N. C. 307 (1884); Rosenberry v. Phil.
,delphia, 7 W. N. C. 558 (1879) ; Freeman v. Philadelphia, 7 W. N.C. 45 (1879) ; Lilly v. Scranton, 2 Lack. L. N. 175 (1893).
Public Health: Bandos v. Philadelphia, 304 Pa. 191, 155 Atl. 2"'9
(1931) ; Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 At!. 273 (1924) ; Howard v. Philadelphia, 250
Pa. 184, 95 At!. 388 (1915); Hand v. Philadelphia, 8 Pa. Cry. Ct. Rep. 213 (1890).
1475 Pa. 347 (1874).
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horse recklessly and furiously on a city street faster than was permitted by ordinance. Due to the negligence of the police the horse was killed and the carriage
damaged. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the District Court of Philadelphia to the effect that the city was not liable and in its brief comment referred
with approval to the reasoning of Judge Thayer of the lower court. Besides asserting that the policemen, although appointed by the city, were "quasi-civil officers"
of the state government, Judge Thayer emphasized the discretionary character ot
their work and observed that it would be unreasonable to hold a municipal corporation responsible for the unauthorized or unlawful acts of its officers and agents.
In discussing the ability of municipalities to control policemen, he said, "A municipal body is bound by law to execute a particular work. It is reasonable to suppose
that they have such opportunities for the constant supervision of the work, and
such constant control of their agents, that they should be responsible for the manner in which the work is done. But will any one say, that it is equally reasonable to
hold the municipality responsible for the acts of these officers in the discharge of
their varied duties, in controlling persons and things, as it is to hold it responsible
for the manner of executing a public improvement? * * * It is quite practicable to
give particular instructions for the performance of a public work and to see that they
are complied with. Is it possible to give particular instructions to police ofi-ers in
regard to what they shall do in every case, and under all possible circumstances
which may arise in the discharge of their various and complicated duties? In
the execution of a public work, nothing need be left to the discretion of the agent.
Can the same be said in regard to the functions which are delegated by a municipal
government to police officers?" 11 This line or reasoning waU ot jsit~d to by t11
Supreme Court in Steele v. McKeesport,16 decided in 1929. Policemen had roped
off a street to protect a crowd of people from anticipated danger, but after the crowd
had dispersed a person drove into the rope and was injured. The court stated that
there was no right of recovery against municipalities for the negligence of their
police departments in the performance of services of a governmental character.
The immunity of cities from liability for the tortious action of firemen was reaffirmed in the recent case of Devers v. Scranton.17 Dever's sued in trtspass to recover damages for the death of his adult son who was run down and killed by a
motor-driven fire ladder truck which was responding to an alarm. The court held
that acts done in the performance of the functions of government, such as protection
of health or property, do not create a liability in tort.
Howard v. Philadelphia18 was a case involving the negligence of a physician
employed by the Philadelphia board of health. A serious illness, necessitating the
161bid, p. 350.
16298 Pa. 116, 148 AtI. 53 (1929).
17308 Pa. 13, 161 Atd 540 (1932). Cf. infra, pp. 162, 163.
18250 Pa. 184, 95 Ad. 388 (1915).
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amputation of one of the plaintiff's limbs, resulted from a vaccination to which
Howard submitted under protest in order to be relieved from quarantine regulations. In denying the liability of the municipality, the court rejected the contention
that in doing what it did the city was exercising a corporate function for the private
advantage and benefit of its inhabitants. The case of Korenic v. Pittsburgh 19
concerned the question of municipal liability for the negligence of servants engaged
in the operation of a city hospital. As a result of negligence, an inmate of the
insane department of the hospital was injured by another patient in an insane attack, but the lower court denied the right to recover damages on the ground that a
hospital is a purely public charity in the operation of which a municipality is
acting in a governmental capacity.
Other functions classed as governmental in Pennsylvania, in connection with
which the rule of non-liability has been applied, are the collection and disposal of
municipal refuse, including street cleaning and the maintenance and operation of
dumps;2 0 the lighting of streets; 21 the maintenance and operation of a morgue and
morgue ambulance; 22 the inspection of buildings; 2 3 the provision of polling
places;24 the administration of poor relief;2 5 the erection and maintenance of
courthouses and jails;26 the creation and administration of a system of schools; 27
the bonding of contractors engaged in the construction of highways to guarantee
payment of labor, materials, and machinery; 28 and the selection of employees to be
discharged under an ordinance requiring a reduction in personnel.29 The inclusion
of some of the activities in this list is warranted only on the authority of decisions
rendered by lower courts without the benefit of a Supreme Court ruling in regard
to the specific matters in question. Moreover, some of the cases have involved school
districts, poor districts, townships, and counties rather than cities or boroughs.
Although the liability of these quasi-corporations, which act primarily as agents
1970 Pitts. Leg. JI. 1001 (1922).
2
0Bandos v. Philadelphia, 304 Pa. 191, 155 At. 279 (1931); Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa.
549, 124 Ad. 273 (1924) ; Healy et al. v. Philadelphia, 117 Super. Ct. 417, 178 Atd. 337 (1935).
Mooney v. Philadelphia, 115 Super. Ct. 433. 175 At. 886 (1934); Siwak v. Rankin, 72 Super.
Ct. 218 (1919); Minkewicz v. Plymouth, 27 Luz. 241 (1932) ; Zellman v. Philadelphia, 17 D. & C.
493 (1932).
2
1Horner v. Philadelphia, 194 Pa. 542, 45 Adl. 330 (1900); Canavan v. Oil City, 183 Pa. 611
(1898).
"2Wray v. County, 69 Pitts. Leg. Jl. 172, 50 C. C. 174, 30 Dist. 344 (1920).
2SWalch v. Clifton Heights, 21 Del. 286, 15 D. & C. 661 (1931).
24Hubbard v. Crawford County, 221 Pa. 438, 70 At. 805 (1908).
25
Wildoner v. Central Poor District, 267 Pa. 375, 110 At. 175 (1920).
26Henry Shenk Co. v. County of Erie, 319 Pa. 100, 178 Atd. 662 (1935); Cousins v; Butler,
73 Super. Ct. 86 (1919).
ZTFord v. School District, 121 Pa. 543, 15 Atd. 812 (1888); Brinton v. School District, 81 Super.
Ct. 450 (1923); Rosenblit v. Philadelphia, 28 Super. Ct. 586 (1905).
28Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 312 Pa. 260, 167 Ad. 782 (1933).
2OLeary v. Philadelphia, 314 Pa. 458, 172 At. 459 (1934).
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of the state, is in fact more limited than that of cities and boroughs, there is no
reason to believe that the cases would have been decided differently had cities or
boroughs been the defendants. 30
The liability of municipal corporations for torts is well established with regard
to municipally owned and operated gas, light, and water supply systems. These activities have been described as corporate or private as distinguished from governmental or public functions. 31 Liability has also been recognized in connection with
the provision and maintenance of parks, playgrounds, swimming pools, and other
recreational facilities, 32 public wharves," 3 public buildings,

34

and an electrical bur-

eau deriving revenue from grants of privileges to private corporations and individuals. 3 5
In holding a municipality liable for negligence in managing its public parks,
the Pennsylvania courts are in disagreement with the courts of many states. It is
the obligation of Pennsylvania municipalities to maintain park structures, amusement appliances, public walks or ways in parks, and playgrounds in such a reason-

ably safe condition as not to imperil the public which is invited to make use of
3OThat the same rules of liability apply in general to both municipal corporations and quasi.
corporations is evidenced by the opinions in a number of cases. Thus in Balashaitis v. Lackawanna
County, 296 Pa. 83, 145 Atd. 691 (1929), the Supreme Court said that a county is a quasi-corporation and is impliedly liable for wrongful acts done in its private or corporate character and from which
it derives some special or immediate advantage or emolument, but not as to such acts done in its
public capacity as a governmental agency in the discharge of duties imposed for the public or general
benefit. Cf., Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 At. 567 (1929) ; Brinton v. School District, 81 Super.
Ct. 450 (1973). However, the statements in earlier cases were that liability attaches to quasicorporations only in connection with the performance of a positive or absolute duty enjoined
or imposed by statute. See Kelley v. Cumberland County, 229 Pa. 289 (1910) ; Bucher v. Northumberland County, 209 Pa. 618 (1904).
31"When a municipal corporation engages in an activity of a business, rather than one of a
governmental nature, such as the supply of light or water, which is generally engaged in by individuals
or private corporations, it acts as such corporation, and not in its sovereign capacity", American
Aniline Products, Inc. v. Lock Haven, 288 Pa. 420, 135 Atd. 726 (1926). See Shirk v. Lancaster
City, 313 Pa. 158, 169 Atl. 557 (1934); Armstrong & Latta v. Philadelphia, 249 Pa. 39, 94 AL.
455 (1915) ; Smith v. Philadelphia, 81 Pa. 38 (1876) ; Philadelphia v. Gilmartin, 71 Pa. 140 (1872);
Philadelphia v. Collins, 68 Pa. 106 (1871). A city, in supplying gas to its inhabitants, acts as a
private corporation and is subject to the same duties, liabilities, and disabilities, Western SavingFund Society
v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175 (1858); Kibele v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. 41 (1884).
32 Fehrs v. McKeesport, 318 Pa. 279, 178 AtL 380 (1935); Paraska v. Scranton, 313 Pa. 227,
!69 At. 434 (1934); Novak v. Ford City Borough, 292 Pa. 537, 141 Atil. 496 (1928); Rockett
v. Philadelphia, 256 Pa. 347, 100 At. 286 (1917) ; Weber v. Harrisburg, 216 Pa. 117, 64 Rl. 905
(1906) ; Glase v. Philadelphia, 169 Pa. 488, 32 At. 600 (1895); Baxthold v. Philadelphia, 154
Pa. 109 (1893).
33Klein v. Philadelphia, 223 Pa. 507, 72 Atd. 845 (1909); Allegheny v. Campbell, 107 Pa.
530 (1884) ; Pittsburgh v. Grier, 22 Pa. 54 (1853).
34Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 At. 567 (1929) ; Wise v. Philadelphia, 239 Pa. 392
(1913) ; Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 AtI. 356 (1904); Kies v. Erie, 169 Pa. 598, 32 At.
621 (1895).
86Bodge v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 492, 31 At. 728 (1895).
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them for rest and pleasure. 3 Thus a city was held liable in damages for an injury
caused by the negligence of city employees in leaving dynamite caps in a park
opened to public use; 37 for injuries caused by the fall of a grandstand which had
become unsafe by reason of decay; 38 for the drowning of a boy due to the negligence of a swimming pool guard in opening a drainage valve without giving
notice;3 9 and for injury suffered as a result of a dangerous obstruction in a park
path.4 0 However, a municipality is not liable for injuries to a pedestrian who falls
in a public park by reason of a defective pathway which has not been constructed
for public use but has been worn by persons walking over it. 4 1 The first appellate
court decision in Pennsylvania involving accidents in public playgrounds was rendered by the Supreme Court in Paraska v. Scranton4 2 in 1934. A child fell from a

swing during one of the regular recreation periods and struck a sharp-edged stone
protruding from the ground directly in the path of the swing when in motion. The
Court held that no sound distinction exists between public parks and public playgrounds and that if a city undertakes to manage and supervise such property, it
must take care to keep it in a reasonably safe condition for those invited to come
upon it.

In regard to municipal liability in connection with public wharves, the
attitude of the courts is that a city, being in possession of a public wharf, exercising
exclusive supervision and control over it, and receiving tolls for its use, is bound to
43
keep it in proper condition for use.

It is difficult to generalize regarding the extent and basis of responsibility for
injuries received in or about public buildings. Two groups of cases are distinguishable. One consists of those cases in which injury results, not from the dangerous
and defective condition of the building, but from the negligent performance ot
activities associated with or involved in the management and operation thereof.
The other comprises cases in which the condition of the building, attributable to
dangerous and negligent construction or maintenance, is the cause of injury.
The determining factor in the former group appears to be the capacity, governmental or private, in which the municipal corporation was deemed to be acting,
as evidenced by the use to which the building was put, the character of the activit)
to which the injury was due, or the status of the officers or employees whose acts were
StThis rule is probably derived from the maxim that municipal corporations -are liable for the

improper management and use of their real property to the same extent and in the same mannel
as private corporations and natural persons. Cf. infra, pp. 158-161.
37Fehrs v. McKeesport, 318 Pa. 279, 178 Atl. 380 (1935).
3t
Daum v. Pittsburgh, 65 Pitts. Leg. J1. 547 (1915).
39
Barto v. McKeesport, 77 Pitts. Leg. JI. 143 (1929).
40Weber v. Harrisburg, 216 Pa. 117, 64 Atil. 905 (1906).
41Sowers v. Philadelphia, 63 Super. Ct. 227 (1916).
42313 Pa. 227, 169 Atd. 434.

48Pittsburgh v. Guier, 22 Pa. 54 (1853)
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involved. Thus in Bell v. Pittsburgh," the details of which have been set forth
above, liability for an injury resulting from the negligent operation of an elevator
was based expressly upon the view that the city and county, joint owners and occupants of the building, were engaged in an enterprise which, by reason of the use
made of the building and the circumstances of the undertaking, was of a corporate
or business character. In an earlier case, Fox v. Philadelphia," although the Court
did not comment upon the capacity in which the city was acting as owner and
manager of the city hall wherein the accident occurred, the city was held liable on
the ground that the rule applicable to common carriers of passengers, according to
which the mere happening of an injurious accident to a passenger raises prima
facie a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier, is also applicable to a
municipality which operates elevators in a public building. Presumably, a municipality acts in a corporate capacity in operating an elevator. In both of these cases
the sole cause of injury was the negligent operation of an auxiliary part of a public
building. Substantially similar circumstances gave rise to the case of Kies v. Erie"6
in which the defendant city was sued for damages because of injuries received by a
passerby when the doors of a fire station swung open. The first time this case was
tried the plaintiff contended that the cause of injury was the carelessness of the
firemen operating the doors, but, as thus presented, the court denied the plaintiff's
claim for damages on the ground that a municipality is not liable for the negligent
acts of its firemen.
The cases involving attribution of injury to the condition of a building
appear to be governed by the rule, discussed subsequently, 4" that municipal
corporations are liable for tie
proper management and use of their real
property to the same extent and in the same manner as'private corporations
and natural persons. In the second trial of Kies v. Erie,"s the plaintiff claimed
that injury was due to the dangerous and negligent construction of the doors,
which opened rapidly through the operation of large steel springs, while the
defendant contended that the springs were only intended to aid the firemen and that
after the doors commenced to move it was the duty of the firemen to prevent too
rapid and violent a motion. This time the court held that the city was not liable if the
accident could[ have been avoided by the use of reasonable care on the part of the
firemen, but that it was liable if the necessary, natural, and probable operation of
the doors was dangerous. In Rosenblitt v. Philadelphia,'9 a pupil was injured by
the fall of plaster from the ceiling of a school room, and while neither the city nor
the school district was held liable for damages, it is significant that the non-liability
4'297 Pa. 185, 146 At. 567 (1929). Cf. supra, pp. 140, 141.
45208 Pa. 127, 57 At. 356 (1904).
46135 Pa. 144, 19 Atd. 942 (1890).
47C. ifflya, pp. 158-161.
4"169 Pa. 598, 32 At. 62 (1895).
4928 Super. Ct. 586 (1905).
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of the city was based on the fact that although the city held title to the building, the
management and control thereof was vested in the school district authorities. The
inference may be drawn that whatever the purpose served by the building, the city
would have been held liable if it had controlled as well as owned the building. Two
other pertinent cases are Burton v. Philadelphia6o and Glase v. Philadelphia."'
The plaintiff in the former case was injured by falling through an unguarded
areaway in a fire station, but was denied damages on the ground that since the
public has no right to inspect fire stations, a city owes no higher duty to persons inspecting them than to trespassers. Here, again, the use of the building for governmental rather than corporate purposes was not commented on by the court. In the
latter case, the Superior Court reversed the judgment of the lower court in nonsuiting the plaintiff who had been injured when he stepped on the revolving lid
of a manhole located on a pumping station roof which the public was permitted to
use as a place of rest and recreation. The reason for the reversal was that the jury
should have been permitted to decide whether or not the design and operation of
the manhole cover was so dangerous as to constitute negligence and whether or not
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Although the immediate basis
of the decision was the same as in the park and recreation cases previously considered, namely, the recognized responsibilities of municipal corporations in providing the public with places of rest and recreation, these responsibilities are closely
associated with, if not derived from, the obligations arising from the ownership and
control of real property in general. The principal use of the pumping station as part
of the city's water supply system seems to have had no bearing upon the case, and
the decision would probably have been the same even if the building had been used
primarily as a police or fire station.
Judging by the foregoing cases, it seems that liability for injuries due to the
condition of a building arises from ownership and control thereof, irrespective of
use, whereas liability for injuries inflicted as a consequence of the negligent management and operation of a public building, apart from its condition, is determined
according to the governmental or corporate character of the activities involved.
However, the case of Cousins v. Buller52 constitutes at least one reason for questioning the validity of the first part of this generalization. In this case a convict awaiting removal to the Allegheny county workhouse suffered injuries when an iron
railing of a jail stairway gave way while he was leaning against it, and the court
denied the liability of the defendant county on the ground that the erection of
courthouses and jails and their maintenance in suitable and convenient order and
repair are purely governmental functions. Although the injury was definitely caused by the condition of the building, the court, in referring to the responsibilities ot
6023 Dist. 1058 (1914).
51169 Pa. 488, 32 Ad. 600 (1895); cf., Unterreiner v. Turtle Creek Borough, 305 Pa. 3,41,
157 Atd. 682 (1931).
5273 Super. Ct. 86 (1919).
See particularly pp. 90,91.
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ownership, distinguished between the acts of municipalities and other governmental
agencies done or performed in their ministerial or corporate character in the management of property for their own benefit or in the exercise of powers assumed
voluntarily for their own advantage, on the one hand, and on the other, those
broader functions of government proper delegated by the state to be performed
by certain public instrumentalities.5 2 Perhaps the point of distinction between
this case and the others lies in the fact that the defendant was a quasi-corporation.
Although municipalities may be held liable for injuries inflicted in the performance of corporate functions, the award of damages in particular instances
depends not only upon the evidence pertaining to negligence and contributory
negligence, but also upon application of the discretionary-ministerial rule, which
will be discussed subsequently, 53 the rule of respondeat superior, and the doctrire
of non-liability for ultra vires acts. A brief summary of a few cases will serve to
illustrate the application of these principles by the courts.
In an action against a city for injuries to a building caused by the breaking
of a water main, recovery of damages was denied because a latent defect in the
pipe was the cause of the break and there was no evidence to show that the defect
could have been discovered by proper inspection. Nor was negligence proved
because the accident might have been prevented by adopting some special method
or device, when such is not commonly done by reasonably prudent persons under
similar circumstances. 5 4 Again, when a water main broke and damaged the plaintiff's property, it was held that there could be no recovery in the absence of evidence
showing that the main was not properly constructed or that leaks which occuried
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v. Pittsburgh5 6 was an action for damages for injuries resulting from a fall into
a washout or ditch beside a graded path in a city park. The plaintiff, who was
standing on the edge of the path watching a race, testified that she did not see
the hole and was not looking about her to notice anything. This amounted to
contributory negligence and judgment was entered for the city.
Three cases involving the rule of respondeat superior, which show the tests
applied to determine whether or not officers are agents or servants of a municipal
corporation, are Ashby v. Erie,5

Alcorn v. Philadelphia," and Ankenbrand v.

Philadelphia.50 The first was a suit to recover damages sustained by the flooding
of a basement in consequence of the bursting of a water main. The water com5Infr.app. 150-153.
4
6 Ritz.Carlton Co. v. Philadelphia, 282 Pa. 307 (1925).
55Allied Realty Co. v. Philadelphia, 95 Super. Ct. 62 (1928).
597 Super. Ct. 56 (1929), 76 Pitts. Leg. JI. 452.
5785 Pa. 286 (1877).
5844 Pa. 348 (1863).
5952 Super. Ct. 581 (1913).
C/., Fox v. Philadelphia, 208 Pa. 127, 57 At.

356 (1904).
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missioners were appointed by the judges of the Court of Common Pleas and derived their authority and duties from a source other than the city. Counsel tor
the plaintiff claimed that the duties of the water commissioners related to the
exercise of the corporate powers of the city and were for the peculiar benefit of
the corporation in its local and special interest, but the court held that the city,
under the law in question, was not liable for the negligence of the water commissioners who were not appointed by it and neither owed obedience nor were accountable to the city authorities. In the Alcorn case it was decided that a city is not
responsible to a lot-owner for damages resulting from the negligent location of
lot lines by a district surveyor over whom it has no control. This officer was elected
directly by the people under authority of a statute rather than an ordinance and
was not subject to removal by the corporate authorities. The third of these cases,
which involved the responsibility of Philadelphia for an injury caused by failure
to keep a park footway in proper repair, necessitated determination of the character
of the relation between the Fairmount Park commissioners and the city. Some
of the commissioners became such by virtue of their being city officers ana the
others were appointed by judges elected by the voters of Philadelphia. The court
remarked that the conclusive test in arriving at the legislative intent as to where
a duty has been imposed is not the mode of appointment of the commissioners,
although that may be a pertinent circumstance, but the nature of their functions
with reference to the public ways of the city within the park limits. In support
of its conclusion that the legislature intended to preserve the paramount dominion
of the city and that the commissioners constituted an agency of the city through
which it performed a municipal function and discharged a municipal duty, the
court pointed out that under the applicable statutes the title to and ownership
of the park and all that belongs to it, whether acquired by purchase, donation, or
the exercise of eminent domain, were vested in the city; that except for donations,
the cost of its laying out, improvement, adornment, and maintenance was borne
by the city; that the commissioners had no fund under their direct control and all
their expenditures were subject to such appropriations as the council might make;
that the commissioners were not a body corporate, municipal, quasi-municipal, or
private; that the power and duty of the city to maintain, which ex vi termini include
the power and duty to keep in a reasonably safe condition, did not rest on uncertain
inferences, but on express and unequivocal legislative declaration; and that, as
the city derives its powers from the legislature, it is for that body to determine
how the officers and agents of the city shall be selected.
As for ultra vires acts, it is well established that municipal corporations are
not liable for damages if the act complained of necessarily lies wholly outside
the general or special powers of the corporation as conferred by its charter or by
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statute. Nor are they accountable for the ultra vires and subsequently unratified
60
actions of their agents and servants.
THE DISCRETIONARY-MINISTERIAL

RULE

Besides the primary public-private test, Pennsylvania courts apply the discretionary-ministerial rule in determining the liability of municipal corporations.
Under this rule a municipality is not liable in damages for failure to exercise or
for the manner in which it exercises powers of a discretionary character. In the
well known case of McDade v. Chester,61 action was brought against the city to
recover damages for a personal injury received by the plaintiff from the explosion
of a privately owned and operated manufactory of fireworks. The factory had
caught fire and the plaintiff was helping to extinguish the flames. McDade contended that the city had neglected its absolute duty to suppress the manufacture
of fireworks which was per se a nuisance, but the court ruled that although the municipal authorities had full power to act in the premises, the power was discretionary
and consequently the city was not liable. The cases of Smith v. Selinsgrove
Borough6 2 and Ewen v. Philadelphia63 were decided in the same way for the same
reason. In the former case a child was bitten by a dog having rabies and suit was
brought for negligence in failing to pass an ordinance prohibiting dogs from running at large. Although the Chief Burgess and Council knew that dogs in such
a condition had been running at large in the borough a few months before the
child was attacked, the court rendered judgment for the defendant borough. In
the latter case the wife of the plaintiff was drowned when a steamboat in Fairmount Park carried down the river and over the Fairmount dam which had been
erected within the park limits by- a private corporation acting under statutory
authority. There was no statute requiring the city to provide safeguards to prevent boats from drifting over the dan, and the claim that the city was liable for
damages because of its failure to maintain such safeguards was denied by the court.
The chief problems involved in the application of this discretionary-ministerial rule are its relation to the public-private criterion of liability and the distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties. An examination of the
opinions in various cases reveals shifts in the attitude of the Supreme Court regarding these matters.
A case which would probably be decided on different grounds today is that
of Grant v. Erie.6 4 By act of the state legislature the city was empowered to con60Betham v. Philadelphia, 196 Pa. 302, 46 Atd. 448 (1900); Elliott v. Philadelphia, 75 Pa.
347 (1874); Fox v. The Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (1841) ; Wahl v. Borough. 64 Super. Ct
155 (1916); Moore v. Coal Twp., 56 Super. Ct. 55 (1914); Hand v. Philadelphia, 8 Pa. Cty. CL
Rep. 213 (1890).
61117 Pa. 414, 12 At. 421 (1888).
62199 Pa. 615, 49 At. 213 (1901).
63194 Pa. 548, 45 At. 339 (1900).
6469 Pa. 420 (1871).
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struct a sufficient number of reservoirs to supply water in case of fire. The council
constructed the reservoirs but allowed one to become so dilapidated that it would
not hold water. Buildings located near this reservoir were destroyed by fire because no water was available, but instead of dismissing the action for damages on
the ground that the provision of water for fire protection was a governmental
function, the court based its denial on the discretionary nature of the authority
granted the city by the legislature. The following excerpt from the opinion in
Carr v. The Northern Liberties15 was quoted with approval: "Where any person
has a right to domand the exercise of a public function, and there is an officer,
or set of officers, authorized to exercise that function, there the right and the
authority give rise to the duty; but when the right depends upon the grant of
authority, and that authority is essentially discretionary, no legal duty is imposed."
To illustrate the meaning of this statement the court declared that if it were made
the duty of a municipality to station a police officer at a particular corner in order
to protect pedestrians from being run over by passing vehicles, it might he
doubted whether it would be an answer to an action to say that a horse and
wagon, and not the absence of the officer, was the cause of injury; but if the
municipality were vested with the authority to employ and keep on foot a sufficient police force, "no one can surely pretend that a foot-passenger run over
by a wagon could sue the corporation for damages, even though he should be
able to show that they had formerly kept an officer at that place for that purpose
and had withdrawn him, or that he had been guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties." 66 From the example used, it may be inferred that the
court might have supported a claim for damages for failure to perform or for
negligence in the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by statute, irresspective of the capacity, governmental or corporate, in which the municipality
was acting.
In Howard v. Philadelphia, the facts of which have been set forth above, 67
the attitude of the court was consistent with the position taken in Grant v. Erie.
Not only was a distinction drawn between duties imposed by law which are imperative and those so imposed which involve the exercise of discretion, but the
general liability of municipalities in connection with governmental duties of an
imperative character appears to have been recognized in principle. In the language of the court, " * * by general rule municipalities are exempt from liability
for the negligent acts of their officers and agents, except in case where the
negligence occurs in the performance of some duty which has been imposed by law
upon the municipality. The rule as thus stated * *0 leaves somewhat to be
supplied because of its conciseness. If we add to it that in order to constitute an
6635 Pa. 324 (186o),

6669 Pa. 424.
67Supra pp. 142, 143.
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exception to the rule the duties so imposed must be imperative and not discretionary,
so as to make clear the distinction between duty and authority, or power; and
further, that the duty must relate to the municipality's public or governmental
functions, as distinguished from its private or corporate functions and duties,
the rule as thus stated is one which has always been recognized in our own state, and
68
obtains in most, if not in all, other states."
Nine years later, however, in the Scibilia case, although approving the use of
the discretionary-ministerial rule in those exceptional instances, to be discussed
shortly, in which municipal liability may be recognized in spite of the performance
of governmental functions, the court limited its general application to liability
cases involving the corporate or business activities of municipalities. "Itshould
be kept in mind", said the court, "that the words 'absolute', 'imperative' and
'ministerial', as used in the rule, denote a definite duty, performance of which can
be demanded of officials empowered to act, and the neglect or omission to perform such a duty is treated in the law as a basis of liability where the obligation
attaches to the city in its corporate, or private, capacity * * * 69 Finally, in certain established instances, failure to comply with a duty of like imperative nature
69
may also create a liability when a municipality acts in its public capacity, foe
example, in connection with the building or construction of highways or public
works, or their repair * * * ; but, to date, these examples, and instances of nuisances on, or improper use of, governmentally owned real estate, seem to mark
the limit of municipal responsibility in respect to the exercise of public or governmental duties, so far as our decisions are concerned * * , though some of the
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further. 70 In support of its position regarding the proper application of the
discretionary-ministerial rule, the court argued that if a breach of an imposed duty
were accepted as the sole or controlling criterion for judging questions of liability
in cases of negligence, such a breach could as well give rise to the right to sue for
damages growing out of the negligence of the police or firemen as of employees
in charge of or working on the construction or repair of highways, since so far
as legislative mandates in Pennsylvania are concerned, "the duty to organize and
maintain police and fire service is just as mandatory on cities, at least on those
of the first class, as the duty to construct and maintain highways." 7 ' The court
concluded that a city, although required to render a particular service to the public,
will not be liable for injuries inflicted in the performance of that duty if the service
is of a governmental character, and expressed the opinion that marked exceptions
to this rule in no way affect the general principle. In spite of an apparent agree68250
69The
70279
71279

Pa. 186 (1915).
italics are the author's.
Pa. 554, 555, 124 Atil. 275 (1924).
Pa. 556, 124 Atd. 275 (1924).
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ment in the matter of general definition, comparison of the illustrations used in
Grant v. Erie and Scibilia v. Philadelphia indicates a difference of opinion concerning the nature of an imperative duty.
As evidenced by the recent case of Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 7 the attitude of
the Supreme Court concerning the proper relation between the public-private and
discretionary-ministerial rules has not changed since the Scibilia opinion was rendered. Suit was brought against Bethlehem for failure to procure bonds from
a contractor in order to indemnify persons furnishing materials, machinery, and
labor in the construction of a highway. Although concluding that pertinent acts
of the state legislature undoubtedly spoke in terms of a command to the respective
municipalities and imposed the duty of securing the additional bond, the court held
that the duty was governmental and that neglect to perform it did not impose
liability upon the city. The proper remedy was to compel performance by mandamus. Apparently, then, the present position of the Supreme Court is that the
discretionary-ministerial rule does not modify the general doctrine of non-liability
in the performance of governmental functions. It is noteworthy, also, as pointed
out in the Scibilia case, that previous decisions of the court in no way conflict with
this view, in spite of statements sometimes included in its opinion.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULES

There are a number of important exceptions to the general rule that municipal
corporations are exempt from liability for torts committed while acting in a governmental capacity. In the first place, a municipality may be held liable for negligence in the construction, repair, and maintenance of streets, sidewalks, sewers,
drains, and other public works. The courts of Pennsylvania place these functions in
the governmental category but give the discretionary-ministerial rule controlling
force in determining liability. 73 According to the Supreme Court, departure, in respect to this group of activities, from the general principle of non-liability in the
performance of governmental functions is based "more on long established precedent than on fixed rules or pure logic." 74 The rule that a municipality is not
liable for the non-exercise of or the manner in which it exercises its discretionary
powers accounts for immunity from liability in connection with determination
of the need for a public improvement and the selection and adoption of a plan
therefore; but for negligence in the execution of a plan and in the maintenance and
repair of an improvement, liability is recognized.75 The general rule of non72312 Pa. 260; 167 At. 782 (1933).
7
sSzilagyi et al. v. Bethlehem, 312 Pa. 268 (1933); Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 555
(1924); Moore v. Luzerne County, 262 Pa. 216, 105 Atl. 94 (1918); Allentown v. Kramer, 73
Pa. 406, 409 (1873).
74279 Pa. 555, 556 (1924). Cf. infra, pp. 164, 165.
5
7 Aron v. Philadelphia, 310 Pa. 84, 164 At. 777 (1933) ; Canavan v. Oil City, 183 Pa, 611
(1898) ; Easton v. Neff, 102 Pa. 474 -(1883) ; Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa, 309 (1879).
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liability for injuries caused by public works constructed upon a faulty plan is subject to the exception that if the facts of a case warrant it, a jury may decide whether
or not the plan, although it need not be the best that engineering skill might have
devised, is so defective as to make its adoption an act of negligence.76
For both temporary and permanent consequential injuries arising from the
exercise of lawful powers in the construction and repair of public improvements,
the appropriate remedy is a proceeding before viewers. As stated in Stork v.
Philadelphia,7 7 the absolute liability for consequential injury imposed on municipalities by the constitution and statutes is for such injury only as is the direct and
necessary consequence of the act of eminent domain, irrespective of care or negligence in doing it; and for such injury proceedings before viewers is the proper
78
remedy, while for negligence in performing the work, trespass is the only relief.
With respect to the effect of municipal action upon watercourses and surface
water, it has been held in Pennsylvania that an action in trespass lies against a
municipal corporation if it neglects to provide or improperly constructs sufficient
ways under a road or bridge to allow a stream or watercourse to pass and so causes
special damage to the complaining party;7 9 if it diverts the waters of a stream and
deprives lower riparian owners of the use thereof; 80 if it negligently diverts the
natural flow of surface water so that it accumulates and flows upon abutting property where it would not otherwise flow;81 or if it collects surface water by aa
artificial channel, thereby increasing its amount, and discharges it in a body upon
the land of a private person to his injury.8 2 However, if acting without negligence,
a municipality is not liable to a property owner in an action of trespass for an
76Levine v. Pittsburgh, 252 Pa. 181, 97 At. 392 (1916); Eichenhofer v. Philadelphia, 248
Pa. 365, 93' At. 1065 (1915) ; McIntyre v. Pittsburgh, 238 Pa. 524, 86 At. 300 (1913) ; Red
v. Tarentum, 213 Pa. 357, 62 At. 928 (1905) ; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. 646, 21 At!. 316;
Childs v. Crawford City, 176 Pa. 139, 34 At, 1020 (1896) ; Lehigh County v. Foffert, 116 Pa. 119,
9 At!. 177 (1887); Oil City and Petroleum Bridge Co. v. Jackson, 114 Pa. 321, 6 At!. 128 (1886);
Diklich v. Johnstown, 118 Super. Ct. 283, 180 At. 41 (1935); Schroeder v. Mechanicsburg Borough, 74 Super. Ct. 532 (1920).
77195 Pa. 101, 45 At!. 678 (1900).
78
See also Robinson v. Norwood Borough, 215 Pa. 375, 64 Al. 539 (1906); Power v. Ridgway
Borough, 149 Pa. 317, 24 At!. 307 (1892); Allentown v. Kramer, 73 Pa. 406 (1873); Green v.
Reading, 9 Watts 382 (1840); Malone v. Philadelphia, 2 Penny. 370 (1882); Schroeder v.
Mechanicsburg Borough, 74 Super. Ct. 532, (1920) ; Beach v. Scranton, 25 Super. Ct. 430 (1904);
Chatham St.. 16 Super. Ct. 103 (1900).
79 Kunkle v. Ford City, 305 Pa. 416, 158 At!. 159 (1931) ; Krug v. St. Mary's, 152 Pa. 30, 25 At!.
161 (1892); Rife v. Middletown, 32 Super. Ct. 68 (1906).
S01rving's Ex'rs v. Media, 194 Pa. 648, 45 At!. 482 (1900); S. C. 10 Super. Ct. 132 (1899).
8IMitchell v. New Castle, 275 Pa. 426, 119 At!. 485 (1923) ; Robinson v. Norwood Borough,
215 Pa. 375, 64 At!. 539 (1906); Weir v. Plymouth Borough, 148 Pa. 566, 24 At!. 94 (1892);
Torrey v. Scranton, 133 Pa. 173, 19 At!. 351 (1890) ; Meninchino v. New Castle, 96 Super. Ct.
; Beach v. Scranton, 25 Super. Ct. 530 (1904).
405 (1929)
82 Frederick v. Lansdale Borough, 156 Pa. 613, 27 At!. 563 (1893); Bohan v. Avoca Borough,
154 Pa. 404, 26 At. 604 (1893) ; Elliott v. Oil City, 129 Pa. 570, 18 At!. 553 (1889).
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increased flow of surface water over or onto his property arising from changes
in the character of the surface produced by the opening of streets, the filling in ot
lots, the building of houses, etc., in the ordinary and regular course of development from rural to urban territory. 83 Although a municipality may collect waters
which would naturally flow on lower land and direct their flow by their own force
and volume on the lower tenement, liability has been recognized if the change in
the course of flow works injury to the owner of the lower tenement.8 4 In an
action for trespass against a city for injuries to land from flooding alleged to be
due to the negligent manner in which the city raised the grade of property and
an alley in the erection of a fire engine house, a verdict for the plaintiff was
sustained where there was evidence that water was diverted and its natural flow
unnecessarily turned upon the plaintiff's property;8 5 but where a borough, without negligence, constructed a paved gutter along a street for draining surface
water, the gutter ending at the borough limits, it was not liable in trespass for
injuries to property because its plan included no provision for disposing of the
water upon reaching the end of the gutter, there having been no increased flow
86
of water caused by its action.
In the matter of sewerage and drainage it has been established by numerous
decisions that municipalities are not liable for failure to provide sewers, gutters.
culverts, and drains, nor for the inadequacy of those provided, but may be held
responsible for injuries which result from carelessness in constructing or repairing
such works or from failure to keep them in good condition and free from obstructions 8 7 Thus, if a method of construction, adequate when undertaken, is of
such a character that the builder should reasonably anticipate that it will subsequently become inadequate due to the decay of material used, a municipality
is affected with knowledge of the fact and must prevent injury to others by proper
inspection and repair. 8 When sewage is discharged into a stream or an open
surface ditch, a municipality is bound to keep the channel open and remove accumuS3Kunkle v. Ford City, 305 Pa. 416, 158 At. 159 (1931); Strauss v. Allentown, 215 Pa. 96,
63 Atl. 1073 (1906) ; Robinson v. Norwood Borough, 215 Pa. 375, 64 At!. 539 (1906) ; Schroeder
v. Mechanicsburg Borough, 74 Super. Ct. 532 (1920).
4
S Taylor v. Canton Twp., 30 Super. Ct. 305 (1906).
8Bruggeman v. York, 63 Super. Ct. 542 (1916).
6
8 Barrett v. Borough, 38 Super. Ct. 76 (1909).
7
S Aron v. Philadelphia, 310 Pa. 84, 164 At. 777 (1933); McNemry v. Bellevue Borough, 301
Pa. 568, 152 At!. 563 (1930); Bear v. Allentown, 148 Pa. 80, 23 At!. 1062 (1892); Michener
v. Philadelphia, 118 Pa. 535, 12 At. 174 (1888) ; Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 102 (1883),
Collins v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. 272 (1880); Fair v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. 309 (1879); Allentown
v. Kramer, 73 Pa. 406 (1873) ; Carr v. The Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) ; Yeager v. Pittsburgh, 103 Super. Ct. 34, 157 Atl. 353 (1931) ; Malpass v. Philadelphia, 52 Super. Ct. 250 (1913)
Herr v. Altoona, 31 Super. Ct. 375 (1906); Siegfried v. Bethlehem, 27 Super. Ct. 456 (1905);
Cooper v. Scranton, 21 Super. Ct. 17 (1902); Loss v. Borough, 70 Pitts. Leg. Jl. 622 (1922).
SgWorkingman's Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh, 284 Pa. 248, 131 Atd. 283 (1925).
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lations of refuse and filth; and if a sewer is so maintained as to emit offensive
odors which create an insanitary and dangerous condition interfering with the safe
and comfortable enjoyment of property to the impairment of its value, damages
may be collected. 89 In several cases involving similar circumstances, responsibility for death, sickness, or physical discomfort was denied on the ground that the
evidence failed to show that conditions created by acts of the city, e. g., a stagnant
pool and a flooded cellar, were the proximate causes of the wrongs upon which
the plaintiffs' claims were based. 0 In Glasgow v. Altoona,91 it was held that
where claims for damages resulting from the pollution of a stream are not merely
for permanent injury to land, but include injury to health, injury to trade, and
deprivation of the use of water, the plaintiff may recover the entire amount of
actual damages up to the trial of the cause irrespective of the value of the land.
Apart from liability for negligence in construction, a municipality is held
to no higher measure of duty so far as streets, highways, street crossings, sidewalks, and bridges are concerned than that of exercising ordinary care to keep
them in a reasonably safe condition, having in view the ordinary requirements
of the public. 9 2 Since the care bestowed must be measured by the extent of public
use, alleys need not be given the same degree of care as streets. 93 No legal duty
is imposed to pave a street with a particular material or in a particular method;
nor is uniformity of construction on all the streets or ways an obligation. Neither
do new or unexpected uses requiring great changes impose upon a municipality
the duty of at once reconstructing a street or alley to suit the new use. 94 Further8JFreedman et al. v. West Hazelton Borough, 297 Pa. 58, 146 Atl. 564 (1929) ; Owens v, Lancaster, 182 Pa. 257, 37 Atl. 858 (1897) ; Blizzard v. Danville, 175 Pa. 479, 34 Atil. 846 (1896);
Good v. Altoona, 162 Pa. 493, 29 Atl. 741 (1894); Yeager v. Pittsburgh, 103 Super. Ct. 34, 157
Atl. 353 (1931).
90Bruggeman v. York City, 254 Pa. 430, 98 Atd. 970 (1916) ; Wharton v. Bradford City,
209, Pa. 319, 58 Atd. 621 (1904).
9127 Super. Ct. 55 (1905).
92
SIreets: Davis v. Wilkes-Barre, 286 Pa. 488, 134 Atl. 105 (1926); Reichard v. Bangor, 286
Pa. 25, 132 Al. 803 (1926) ; Lawrence v. Scranton, 284 Pa. 215, 130 At. 428 (1925) ; Reddington
v. Philadelphia, 253 Pa. 390, 98 Al. 601 (1916); Levine v. Pittsburgh, 252 Pa. 181, 97 At. 392
(1916) ; Short v. Carbondale, 249 Pa. 564 (1915) ; McDonald v. Philadelphia, 248 Pa. 145, 93 Atl.
959 (1915) ; Bucher v. Sunbury Borough, 216 Pa. 89, 64 Atl. 906 (1906) ; and other cases cited in
the text. Sireet crossings: Chilton v. Carbondale, 160 Pa. 463, 28 Atl. 833 (1894) ; Easton v. Neff,
102 Pa. 474 (1883). Sidewalks: Roth v. Verona Borough et al., 316 Pa. 279, 175 Atl. 689 (1934);
Tauber v. Wilkinsburg, 309 Pa. 331, 163 Atl. 675 (1933); Wyman v. Philadelphia, 175 Pa. 117,
;4 Atd. 621 (1896) ; Brookville v. Arthurs, 152 Pa. 334, 25 Atl. 551 (1892) ; McLoughlin v. Philadelphia. 142 Pa. 80, 21 At. 754 (189I) ; Felts v. Borough, 104 Super. Ct. 59, 158 Atl. 592 (1932) ;
Hammer v. Philadelphia, 104 Super. Ct. 119 (1932).
Bridges: Eichenhofer v. Philadelphia, 248
Pa. 365, 93 AtL. 1065 (1915) ; Herrlein v. McKeesport, 247 Pa. 277, 93 Atl. 319 (1915); McLoughlin v. Corry, 77 Pa. 109 (1875) ; Prinkey v. Dunbar Twp., 105 Super. Ct. 326, 161 AtL. 640
(1932); Yordy v. Northumberland, 104 Super. Ct. 237, 158 At!. 607 (1932).
3
9 Musick v. Latrobe Borough, 184 Pa. 375, 39 Atl. 226 (1898).
94Megargee v. Philadelphia, 153 Pa. 340, 25 At!. 1130 (1893).
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more,' a municipal corporation charged with the duty of keeping the highways in
repair is not liable to the owner or occupier of property fronting thereon for the
loss to his business resulting from the neglect of such duty, since one who is
injured by a public nuisance, either in his person or property, cannot have his
remedy by an action unless he cal show a damage which is peculiar to himself and
different in kind and degree from and beyond that which is sustained by the
general public. 95
To demonstrate the circumstances under which liability in regard to streets
and highways is recognized, a few representative cases will be summarized. A
verdict for the plaintiff was sustained in a case in which a city used a wall belonging
to an abutting owner as a support for a street, pavement, and gutter, and by faulty
construction and negligent care of the street and gutter, the wall was destroyed and
the owner's cellar damaged. 98 In Munley v. Sugar Notch Borough,97 the borough
was held liable for personal injuries because it permitted mortar boxes to remain
for three or four weeks in a much traveled street, and in Walker v. Philadelphia,"
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed because the plaintiff, on alighting from
a car, stepped into a hole in what appeared at the time of the accident to be an
even street surface, the street being dimly lighted and the hole filled with dirty
water. The fact that a defect or obstruction in a street is the result of the acts
of persons who are neither representatives nor employees of a municipality does
not relieve it from liability if it had actual or constructive notice thereof. 99

Or-

dinarily, a municipality is held to have constructive notice of defects in a highway
only when they can be seen by one of its officers exercising reasonable supervision,
and not when the defects are so slight as not to attract the attention of pedestrians. 100
It is the duty of a municipality to inspect carefully poles and wires erected on a
street, failure to do so constituting such negligence as to allow recovery in case
of personal injuries,101 and if a city permits a street railway company to construct
its railways on the streets in such a way as to render the use of the streets by the
public unsafe and dangerous, the city will be responsible for injuries resulting
therefrom.' 0z With regard to snow and ice, the liability of a municipality for in95Gold v. Philadelphia, 115 Pa. 184, 8 At]. 386 (1887).
96Edwards v. Williamsport, 36 Super. Ct. 42 (1908).

97215 Pa. 228,64 Atd. 377 (1906).
98211 Pa. 38, 60 Atd. 318 (1905).
9

9 Fleming v. Wilmerding, 223 Pa. 295, 72 Atd. 624 (1909) ; Koch v. Williamsport, 195 Pa. 488.
46 At. 67 (1900) ; Mooney v. Luzerne, 186 Pa. 161, 40 Atl. 311 (1898) ; Scranton v. Catterson, a4
Pa. 202 (1880).
lO0Malone v. Union Paving Co., 306 Pa. 111, 159 Atl. 21 (1932).

lOlKost v. Ashland Borough, 236 Pa. 164, 84 At. 691 (1912) ; Mooney v. Luzerne, 186 Pa.
161, 40 Atl. 311 (1898).
Io2MCKim v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 243, 66 Al. 340 (1907) ; if an excavation or obstruction is
created in a street by a railroad company while relaying tracks, the municipalit is not liable when the
plaintiff is injured before the abandonment of the work, Long v. Philadelphia, 212 Pa. 125, 61 Atl.
810 (1905).
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juries to travelers caused by accumulations of ice and snow on its streets depends
on whether it has exercised reasonable care and diligence to keep its streets reasonably safe for travelers who are using due care, and its liability should be made
to depend upon what is reasonable under all circumstances, paying attention to
climatic conditions. A municipality cannot prevent the general slipperiness of its
streets caused by ice and snow, but it can prevent, by drain or otherwise, such
accumulations thereof, in the shape of ridges or hills, as render their passage
dangerous.10 8 While the height and size of the ridges may not be capable of
exact definition, they must at least be such as to be generally observable as unsafe
and likely to cause injury to travelers. 104
The construction and repair of public works is frequently carried on by
private contractors or by licensees, and the question of municipal liability under
such circumstances has been presented to the courts in a number of cases. If
street pavements or sidewalks are being constructed or repaired, or if the contractor or licensee is making street excavations to lay sewers or water pipes, or for
other purposes, the duty of municipalities to maintain streets in a reasonably safe
condition for both pedestrian and vehicular travel is involved. 10 The prevailing
rule in Pennsylvania is that a municipality is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor or licensee unless the work is done under the-direction and
control of, not merely inspection by, the municipal authorities; unless the work
is intrinsically dangerous; or unless the contractor is required to keep a thoroughfare open and lacks exclusive control thereover with authority to prohibit its use
by the public. 106 If the primary negligence is that of a contractor, an abutting
owner, or other third person, and a judgment s rernuorpd agans he municipality alone, it may recover against the person whose negligence was the cause
107
of the injury.
Another line of cases in which damages may be awarded despite the performance of governmental functions is governed by the principle that municipal
corporations are liable for the improper management and use of their real property
to the same extent and in the same manner as private corporations and natural
persons. The injuries to persons or property for which liability is recognized in-

103McCracken v. Curwensville Borough, 309 Pa. 98. 163 At. 217 (1932).
10-Bailey v. Oil City, 305 Pa. 325, 157 At. 486 (1931).
lOlMeyers v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 159, 66 Atl. 251 (1907).
lo6SCott v. Eric, 297 Pa. 344, 147 At. 68 (1929); Reichard v. Bangor. 286 Pa. 25, 132 At.
803 (1926) ; Norbeck v. Philadelphia, 224 Pa. 30, 73 Atd. 179 (1909) ; Levenite v. Lancaster, 215 Pa.
576, 64 At. 782 (1906); White v. Philadelphia, 201 Pa. 512, 51 At. 332 (1902); Stork v. Philodelphia, 199 Pa. 462, 49 At. 236 (1901) ; Burger v. Philalelphia, 196 Pa. 41, 46 Atd. 262 (1900);
Susquehanna Depot Borough v. Simmons, 112 Pa. 384, 5 At. 434 (1886); Harrisburgh v. Saylor,
87 Pa. 216 (1878); Reed v. Allegheny City, 79 Pa. 300 (1875) ; Painter v. Pittsburgh, 46 Pa. 213
(1863); Haas v. Borough, 54 Super. Ct. 75 (1913)-; Rose v. Philadelphia, 31 L. I. 165 (1874).
l07Brobston v. Borough of Darby, 290 Pa. 331, 138 Ad. 849 (1927).
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dude such as are caused by either the condition of real estate or the existence of
a nuisance thereon.
It was suggested above' 08 that this rule probably accounts for the attitude
of the Pennsylvania courts regarding the responsibilities of municipal corporations
in connection with wharves, parks, and playgrounds; and its application in public
building cases has also been considered. 109 Consequently, these cases need not be
discussed againat this point, except for a brief reference to Kies v. Erie.110 In
that case, it will be recalled, the fact that the building was being used in the performance of a governmental function, fire protection, did not deter the court from
ruling that the city was liable if the necessary, natural, and probable operation
of the fire station doors was dangerous. Although the doors swung open over
a street sidewalk along which the injured person was passing, the city's liability
was based upon the responsibilities associated with the ownership and control of
real property and not upon its obligation to exercise reasonable care to keep streets
in a reasonably safe condition for public use.
This duty was involved in Lawrence v. Scranton,"' but the case is presented
in this connection because of its bearing onthe question of liability for nuisance.
A fifteen year old boy, while playing on a street, struck a match on a manhole
cover to light a cigarette and was injured when an explosion of gas occurred. The
presence of the gas could only be accounted for through a leak in gas mains some
distance away, the gas escaping along a water pipe leading to the manhole. There
was evidence that an employee of the city had examined the manhole daily for
about a month prior to the accident and had found quantities of gas collected
therein. The court, in holding that the case was for the jury, stated that municipalities, as governmental agencies, have a discretionary power to abate certain kinds of
nuisances, but that they become civilly liable if they permit a nuisance to exist on
their own property to the damage of others, or if damage results from the continued existence of a known nuisance on a street. Remarking that a given condition
in a street may not technically be a nuisance, the court referred to the liability of
municipalities for injuries sustained because of failure to use ordinary care in keeping streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel.
Two cases in which nuisances were maintained on city property utilized for
governmental purposes are Siwak v. Borougb of Rankin 12 and Briegel v. Philadelphia.113 A verdict for the plaintiff was sustained in the Siwak case because the
evidence tended to show that the dwellings of the plaintiff were rendered uninhabitable and dangerous to the health of the occupants by reason of noisome and
108Supra, note 36.
lOSSupra, pp. 146-148.
110169*Pa. 598, 32 At. 621 (1895).
111284 Pa. 215, 130 At. 428 (1925).
11272 Super. Ct. 218 (1919). See also Brinton v.School District, 81 Super. Ct. 450 (1923).
118135 Pa, 451, 19 Ad. 1038 (1890).
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noxious vapors and stenches resulting from the operation of the borough's incinerating plant erected on land owned by the borough and located within its limits.
In the Briegel case, the city was held liable for actual damage sustained when a
defectively constructed privy well, which was maintained upon city property used
for public school purposes, created a nuisance to the injury of an adjoining property owner. The city was the owner in fee of the property and derived a remuneration for its use for school purposes, permitting the board of school directors
to use it in consideration of a certain sum collectible by taxation from its citizens.
Liability for the creation of a nuisance in the discharge of governmental
duties has also been recognized in cases wherein the municipalities concerned did
not own the property upon which the nuisance existed. Thus in Minkewicz v.
Plymouth Borough,114 a case in which a municipal dump was maintained upon
privately owned land with the permission of the owner, it was held that the principle of liability for nuisance does not depend upon ownership, but applies as
well to a municipality as lessee, or as one gratuitously allowed to utilize property
as donee of its use.
According to two decisions rendered by the Superior Court, the liability
of a municipality in connection with its real property depends not only upon the
possession of title thereto, but also upon the management or control thereof. In
Rosenblit v. Philadelphia,115 the city, which is coterminous with the first school
district of Pennsylvania and which had legal title to the school building, was held
not to be liable in damages for an injury caused by falling plaster on the ground
that the building was in the actual possession and control of the sectional board
and that the city had no voice in the selection or removal of the officers, agents,
or architects of the school district. The non-liability of the school district was
based on the view that the negligence of the school authorities was in the failure t.
discharge their public duty to provide and maintain suitable and adequate accommodations for the public schools. This duty did not grow out of their right to
control and manage the particular building or any other property but was founded
upon the express provisions of the legislation which created the school district,
provided the officers to represent it, and regulated the system of public education.
In the'performance of this duty the school district was acting in a governmental
capacity. The Briegel case was distinguished as one of that line of cases in which
it has been held that the question was not one of negligence or no negligence, but
of nuisance or no nuisance. A year later, in McCullough v. Philadelphia, 16 the
exemption of the city from liability for personal injuries sustained by a child as
11427 Luz. Leg. Reg. 241 (1932). Cf., Zellman v. Philadelphia, 17 D. & C. 493 (1932). See
also Freedman et al. v. West Hazelton Borough, 297 Pa. 58, 146 At. 564 (1929) ; Owens v. Lancaster
182 Pa. 257, 37 At. 858 (1897); Vanderslice v. Philadelphia, 103 Pa. 102 (1883); and other cases
concerning the disposal of sewage.
11628 Super. Ct. 586 (1905).
118 3 2 Super. Ct. 109 (1906).
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the result of a defect in the pavement of a school yard was likewise based on the
ground that although legal title to the property was in the city, the control and
management of the yard in question was in the hands of the school district authorities. In its opinion the Superior Court made a general statement to the effect that
ownership with the right to control property, and not merely the holding of legal
title, fixes a party with liability for damages resulting not only from a neglect to
117
repair but also from the maintenance of a nuisance.
Although this question of ownership and control was not raised in the Briegel
case, it is unlikely that a different decision would have been reached, since the
improper construction of the privy well appears to have been the act of the city.
In any event this case was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in 1923.11
Another exception to the rule of non-liability in the performance of governmental functions is in connection with the use of highly dangerous agents. This
is illustrated by the case of Herron v. Pittsburgh'19 which was an action against the
city to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by a boy from contact with
a live and naked telephone wire used in the police service of the city. It appeared
that the break in the wire was known to the police officials within an hour after
it occurred and that it was also known to them that in close proximity were other
wires carrying high and dangerous voltage. The Supreme Court held that it is the
duty of all parties, including cities, using a highly dangerous agent to exercise care
commensurate with the danger in order to prevent injury to persons or property
exposed to its influence, and that the use or supervision of the agent under the
police power does not excuse negligence in such use. A similar case is that of
120
Emery v. Philadelphia.
Death was caused by contact with a broken wire used
exclusively for fire alarm purposes and located a number of feet from the improved
portion of a country road. The court held the city liable on the ground that a
municipality may not, with impunity, leave a highly dangerous and insidious obstruction, such as a heavily charged and exposed electric wire, on any part of a
public highway or so near it that a traveler, accidentally or intentionally deviating
a few feet from the beaten track, may encounter it at the risk of his life. Both of
these cases involved the duty to keep streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel,
and the fact that the accidents occurred on highways was indicative of the lawful
presence of the injured parties.
7

11' 1n Powers v. Philadelphia, 18 Super. Ct. 621 (1902), the city was held liable for injuries
to a school boy suffered by reason of negligence in the maintenance of a dangerous board walk running from a main building to an annex on property owned by the city. Referring to this decision
in the Rosenblit case, the court pointed out that it was assumed that the ownership 6f the property,
the right to control and management and to determine when and how it should be repaired was in
the city.
118Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 549, 124 Atl. 273 (1924).
119204 Pa. 509, 54 At. 311 (1903)
120208 Pa. 492, 57 Atl. 977 (1904).
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STATUTORY IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY

The field within which Pennsylvania municipalities enjoy immunity from
liability for torts under the common law has been narrowed somewhat by both constitutional and statutory provisions. However, aside from the imposition of liability for consequential injuries arising from the construction and enlargement of
public improvements,' 21 to which attention has been directed above, the constitution contains no provisions regarding the responsibilities of municipal corporations
for injuries inflicted upon persons or property.
Under special acts passed in 1841, 1849, and 1863, Philadelphia, Allegheny,
and Northampton counties are suable for the recovery of damages to property,
both real and personal, sustained by reason of riots or the destructive acts of nipbs,
provided, however, that the destruction of the property is not caused by the owner's
illegal or improper conduct, and provided also that the owner, having knowledge
of the intention or attempt to destroy his property, gives notice thereof, if sufficient
time intervenes, to the sheriff of the county or to a constable, alderman, or justice
122
of the peace of the ward, township, or borough in which such property is situated.
Under the common law municipalities are not liable for damage caused by mobs
and rioters.12
By legislative enactment of 1927, as amended in 1929 and 1931,124 every
county, city, borough, incorporated town, or township is made jointly and severally
liable with any employee for any damages caused by the negligence of such person
while operating a motor vehicle upon a highway in the course of his employment;
and every city, borough, incorporated town, and township is made jointly and
severally liable with any member of a vulunteer fire company for any damage
caused by negligence in operating a motor vehicle used by or belonging to such
company, while going to, attending, or returning from a fire, or while engaged
in any other proper use of such motor vehicle within the limits of the municipality.
The legislature's definition of a vehicle is "every device in, upon, or by which any
person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a public highway, excepting tractors, agricultural machinery, and devices moved by human power or
used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks"; and a "motor vehicle" is defined
as "every vehicle, as herein defined, which is self-propelled, except tractors, power

121Constitution of Pennsylvania, Art. XVI, Sec. 8.
1t3Acts of May 31, 1841, P. L. 415, Secs. 7 and 8, 16 PS 3921, 3922; March 20, 1849, P. L.
184, Sec. 1,16 PS 3925; April 15, 1863, P. L. 499, 16 P. S. 3921, Note 5. See Person v. North.
empton County, 19 Dist. 691 (1910).
12ANorristown v. Fitzpatrick, 94 Pa. 121 (1880); Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa.
397 (1#79).
12AActs of May 11, 1927, P.L. 886. Art. VI, Sec. 620; May 1,1929, P.L. 905, Art. VI. Sec.
619, 7 PS 212; June 22, 1931, P. L 751, Sec. 2, 75 PS 212.
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shovels, road rollers, agricultural machinery, and vehicles which move upon or are
guided by a track, or travel through the air." 126
A review of the cases arising under this legislation shows that its effect upon
the liability of municipalities for the negligent operation of motorized vehicles can
only be stated in general terms. In Devers v. Scranton,126 the Supreme Court held
that a city was not liable under the statute for an injury resulting from the
negligence of a member of the paid fire department in operating a fire ladder
truck. The reasons advanced in support of this decision were, first, that a fire
truck is not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Vehicle Code, and secondly, that if the legislature had intended to fix liability upon municipalities for the
negligence of the paid employees of their fire or police departments, it would
have stated so specifically in the act, as it did in the case of volunteer fire companies. The soundness of the court's interpretation is open to question on several
grounds, and one of these is the point that the term "motor vehicle" is also used in
the clause pertaining to volunteer fire companies. Of course, the inclusion thereunder of the fire fighting apparatus of such companies may be defended by reference to the opening paragraph of section 102 of the Code which states that for the
purposes of the act words and phrases shall have the meanings respectively ascribed
to them in this section "except in those instances where the context clearly indicates a different meaning." In response to this defense, however, it may be contended that this same paragraph might have been relied upon to support the conclusion that the legislature intended to impose liability for the negligence of paid
firemen in operating motorized fire fighting apparatus, especially since there is
much to be said for the view that the addition of the special clause pertaining to
members of volunteer companies lends emphasis to the seemingly all-inclusive
meaning of the words "any employee" and "in the course of his employment",
as used in the clause preceding.
Whether or not the remarks in Devers v. Scranton about paid policemen and
firemen indicated a disposition on the part of the court to consider the statutory
provisions in question as not intended to curtail the immunity of municipal corporations when acting in a governmental capacity, the decision and opinion in
Graff v. McKeesport 2" dispel whatever uncertainty may have existed in regard to
this matter. McKeesport was held liable under the statute when a paid police
officer, backing a police car away from the place where it had been parked, knocked
down and injured the plaintiff who had stepped off the curb behind the car. In
its opinion the court referred with approval to the ruling regarding fire trucks in
theDevers case and asserted that it was the intention of the legislature to impose
liability only in connection with those motor-driven vehicles which in their primary
125Act 6 May 1, 1929, P. L. 905, Art I,
126308 Pa. 13, 161 At. 540 (1932).
127316 Pa. 263, 175 Ad. 426 (1934).

Sec. 102, 75 PS 2.
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function are devices in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a public highway.
This "primary function" test has been applied by the appellate courts in three
other cases. In Mallinger v. Pittsburgh'2 8 the city was held liable for damages
caused by the negligent operation of a city-owned car which was operated by a
supervisor of the bureau of highways and sewers who had driven to the locality
in which the accident occurred for the purpose of inspecting the work of city employees engaged in the removal of debris accumulated in a nearby public alley;
while in Mooney v. Philadelphia129 a motor-driven garbage truck was held to be
a motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute on the ground that a garbage
truck is "employed in transportation, being loaded at various places and unloaded
at another place", and that in this respect the purpose for which it is used differs
materially from the functions of a fire ladder truck. In the third case, Healy v.
Philadelphiaj1 0 it was decided that a motor-driven sprinkler used for street cleaning purposes belongs in the category of devices exemplified by fire fighting apparatus.
As matters stand, then, at the time of writing, the highest courts have held
municipalities liable under the statute for injuries inflicted by a police car, a garbage
truck, and a car utilized in highway and sewer inspection work, but not for the
negligent operation of a fire ladder truck and a street sprinkler. Discussing the
"primary function" criterion devised by the Supreme Court, the Superior Court
remarked that "if it be thought that a distinction, with regard to the liability of a
municipality, between the negligent operation of a garbage truck and the like
operation of a street sprinkler is too refined, the remedy is with the legislature." 13'
The foregoing is the only legislation which, in express terms, imposes liability
for torts upon municipalities in Pennsylvania, but on several occasions the courts
have maintained that liability in connection with the construction, repair, and maintenance of highways, bridges, and other public works is based upon statutory im33
plication.13 2 However, this point of view has not been adhered to consistently.
14
In Szilagyi v. Bethlehem,' the Supreme Court stated that the ruling as to liability for accident through failure to maintain and repair streets and highways is
purely a matter of legislative intent and purpose to impose liability on the various
128316 Pa. 257, 175 At. 525 (1934).
129115 Super. Ct. 433, 175 At. 886 (1934).

130117 Super. Ct. 417, 178 Ad. 337 (1935).
13iHealy et al. v. Philadelphia, 117 Super. Ct. 422, 178 At. 339 (1935).
IS2Brunacci v. Plains Township, 315 Pa. 391, 173 Atil, 329 (1934); Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 312
Pa. 260, 167 At. 782 (1933); Clark v. Allegheny County, 260 Pa. 199, 103 Atd. 552 (1918);
Kelley v. Cumberland County, 229 Pa. 289, 78 Ati. 276 (1910).
l33Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 524, 124 At. 273 (1924) ; Ford v. School District, 121 Pa.
543, 15 Ad. 812 (1888) ; Cousins v. Butler, 73 Super. Ct. 86 (1919).
134312 Pa. 260 (1933).
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subdivisions of government; that it was so decided in Dean v. New Milford Township;136 and that a constitutional provision was required to create a remedy for an
undoubted wrong committed in the construction of a highway.18 6 An examination of the New Milford opinion indicates that the court probably had in mind
the statement therein that a suit would well be brought against the supervisors of
the township because, by the 27th and 28th sections of the Act of June 13, 1836,
the duty of maintaining and repairing roads is thrown upon them, and they are
agents of the corporation. The judge in this early case based his conclusion on the
rule that neglect of an absolute duty imposed by statute creates liability. This same
37
a case in which the court held that
test was applied in Winpenny v. Philadelphia,1
by the 28th section of the Consolidation Act passed February 2, 1854, P. L. 21, it
was made the duty of the city council to keep the navigable waters within said city
forever open and free from obstructions, and that consequently the city was liable
for failure to do so.
Since, as pointed out above, 138 the Supreme Court has taken the position in
recent cases, including the Szilagyi case, that this "imperative duty" rule has no
proper application when governmental functions are involved, the explanation of
liability for negligence in the maintenance and repair of highways and streets,
which was given in Scibilia v. Philadelphia, is superior, from the standpoint ot
consistency, to that advanced in Szilagyi v. Bethlehem. In the Scibilia case, the
court pointed out that recovery of damages had been allowed in the earlier cases
on the ground that the negligence of the governmental agencies represented a
breach of an imperative duty expressly imposed by the State, but asserted that
the decisions in this particular kind of a case are in a class by themselves and depend
more on long established precedent than on fixed rules or pure logic.1 39
Whatever the correct explanation of these decisions, the present attitude of
court seems to be that, so far as governmental functions in general are
highest
the
concerned, statutory imposition of an imperative duty does not in itself warrant
the inference that the legislature intended to impose liability. Certainly, no such
conclusion was drawn in the Szilagyi case. 14° Nevertheless, it was stated in Brunacci
v. Plains Township"' that in order to hold a township liable for the condition ot
a sidewalk, there must be legislation compelling repair and maintenance; and this
statement indicates that even now legislative imposition of the duty to repair and
maintain public works is likely to be accepted as conclusive evidence of legislative
intention that municipalities should be held liable for neglect thereof.
1355 W.

& S. 545

(1843).

136The wrongs referred to are consequential injuries.
13765 Pa. 135 (1870). Cf., Snyder v. Philadelphia, 78 Pa. 23 (1875).
1sgSupra, pp. 152, 153.
139279 Pa. 555, 556.
14OFor the details of this case see supra, p. 153.
141315 Pa. 391, 173 At. 329 (1934).
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LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ATTITUDES TOWARD AN EXTENSION
OF MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

As for the attitude of the legislature toward an extension of municipal liability in tort, the best available evidence is the action that has been taken to date.
Although the liability clauses contained in the Motor Vehicle Code of 1927, is
amended in 1929 and 1931, are the only instances, since 1863, of legislation expressly imposing liability for negligence, this action represents an important step
toward the curtailment of municipal immunity from responsibility for negligence
in the performance of governmental functions.
The position taken by the judicial branch of the government is that the problem of extending municipal liability is legislative rather than judicial in character,
since questions of public policy of an economic nature are involved. The Supreme
Court has said that maybe, when providing for the exercise of authority which is
on the borderline between governmental and corporate functions, and perhaps in
other instances, the legislature ought to make the municipalities expressly liable
for damages where negligence in the exercise of, or in the omission to exercise, the
powers in question causes injuries to others, 14 2 but it has consistently maintained
that changes in the established rules concerning liability must await legislative
action. It has also asserted that acts of the legislature pertaining to liability will be
strictly construed and that liability will not be recognized unless it is clearly the
intention of the legislature that it be imposed. "J
A review of the cases decided by the appellate courts over a period of more
than a hundred years indicates that no substantial change has occurred in the
judiciary's position regarding the extent of municipal liability. If anything, the
tendency has been to narrow it, because during the last fifteen years the Supreme
Court has stated in definite terms that the discretionary-ministerial rule is limited
in application to services of a corporate character, except in connection with those
activities, governmental in nature, in the performance of which liability has for
a long time been recognized, whereas, as shown above, the opinions in earlier cases
contained statements indicative of the view that the discretionary-ministerial rule
has a broader application.
Another noteworthy feature of the cases decided in recent years is the attempt to clarify the law of liability through more comprehensive and precise statements regarding the controlling principles. These may be summarized briefly
as follows: (1) municipal corporations may be held liable if acting in a corporate,
as distinguished from a governmental, capacity; (2) on the basis of long established
precedent, liability is also recognized in the performance of certain functions of
142Scibilia v. Philadelphia, 279 Pa. 560 (1924).
143Recent cases including statements to this effect are Szilagyi v. Bethlehem, 312 Pa. 260, 167
Ad. 782 (1933); Devers v. Scranton, 308 Pa. 13, 161- Ad. 540 (1932); ard Scibilia v. Philadelphia,
279 Pa. 549, 124 Ad. 273 (1924).
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a governmental character; (3) the discretionary-ministerial rule, according to which
a municipal corporation is not liable for the non-exercise of, or for the manner in
which it exercises, its discretionary powers, is to be applied in determining liability
for injury due to any activity, whether governmental or corporate, falling within
the category of activities with respect to which the principle of liability has been
established; (4) the rule of non-liability in the performance of governmental
functions does not relieve a municipal corporation of responsibility for creating
and maintaining a nuisance, for the negligent use of highly dangerous agents, or
for neglecting duties arising from the ownership and control of real property.
Considerations of fairness and justice have led to
protests against the application of some of these rules, which seem to be based upon rather arbitrary and
unreasonable distinctions, especially from the standpoint of persons who have
suffered injuries through no fault of their own. Although the Pennsylvania
courts may, perhaps, deserve criticism for adhering to them, as well as for a seemingly narrow construction of the liability clauses in the Motor Vehicle Code, there
is much to be said in defense of the conservative stand taken by the judicial branch.
So many matters of policy are involved that legislative action based upon careful
consideration of all aspects of the problem will probably prove more satisfactbry
in the long run than court action.
From the standpoint of social justice, for instance, some of the questions
to be decided are whether the present policy of immunity from liability in certain
designated fields of governmental activity should be continued, and if so, in
which fields. Should liability be recognized for all injuries resulting from the
performance of public services, irrespective of negligence or contributory negligence,
or for all except those due to the carelessness of the injured party, or merely for
injuries attributable to the negligence of the public authorities? The financial
effects of any extension of liability should also be the subject of careful investigation. Will municipalities be able to bear the burden of an extended liability,
or should the state government provide the funds needed to pay damages for
injuries resulting from the performance of governmental, as distinguished from
corporate, functions? Should a liability fund supported by contributions from both
municipalities and the state, or from municipalities only, be established upon an
actuarial basis? Questions of this type ought to be raised and answered in the
development of a sound policy concerning municipal liability in tort, 144 and the
task is clearly one that ought to be undertaken, sooner or later, by the legislative
branch of the government.
Bethlehem, Pa.
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E. B. Schulz

1 For discussions of the theoretical and practical aspects of this problem, see the references
given in Note 1.

